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Abstract
We study the social efficiency of several well-known mechanisms for the allocation of a set of avail-
able (advertising) positions to a set of competing budget-constrained users (advertisers). Specifically, we
focus on the Generalized Second Price auction (GSP), the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism (VCG)
and the Expressive Generalized First Price auction (EGFP). Using the liquid welfare as our efficiency
benchmark, we prove a tight bound of 2 on the liquid price of anarchy and stability of these mechanisms
for pure Nash equilibria.
1 Introduction
Position mechanisms have been widely used for the allocation of advertising positions (with different click-
through rates) when keywords are queried in search engines. Such mechanisms auction off the available
positions to the interested advertisers, who in turn compete with each other by submitting bids, expressing
how much they value the available advertising positions (per user click).
There have been numerous papers analyzing the properties of position mechanisms. Edelman et al. [11]
(see also [18]) studied the generalized first price auction (GFP) as well as the generalized second price
auction (GSP). According to these mechanisms, the advertisers are sorted in terms of the scalar bids that
they submit, and each of them pays her own bid or the next highest bid, respectively. The definition of the
mechanisms allow the advertisers to strategize over their bids and engage as players into a strategic game.
Edelman et al. [11] proved that the games induced by GFP are not guaranteed to have pure Nash equilibria,
while the games induced by GSP always have socially efficient pure Nash equilibria with respect to the social
welfare benchmark (the total value of the players for the positions they are given); consequently, the price
∗This work has been partially supported by a PhD scholarship from the Onassis Foundation, and by the European Research
Council (ERC) under grant number 639945 (ACCORD).
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of stability [1] of GSP is equal to 1. Caragiannis et al. [3] (see also [17]) focused on worst-case equilibria
and proved several bounds on the price of anarchy [13] of GSP with respect to a variety of equilibrium
concepts, ranging from pure Nash and coarse-correlated equilibria in the full information setting to Bayes-
Nash equilibria in the incomplete information setting. Du¨tting et al. [10] proved bounds on the revenue and
exploited more expressive input formats as a remedy for the non-existence of pure Nash equilibria in games
induced by GFP. They designed the expressive generalized first price auction (EGFP) according to which
each player submits a bid per position, the positions are auctioned off sequentially, and each player pays her
bid for the position she is given.
All of the aforementioned papers studied the no-budget setting, where the players are assumed to be
able to afford any payments, no matter how large these can get. However, in reality, the players have hard
budget constraints that upper-bound the payments that they can afford. Following a series of recent papers
that focus on such budget-constrained settings, we also study the social efficiency of position mechanisms
by bounding the (pure) price of anarchy and stability in terms of the liquid welfare benchmark that takes
budgets into account. Liquid welfare was first introduced by Dobzinski and Paes Leme [9] who focused
on the design of truthful mechanisms for the allocation of multiple units of a single divisible item (see also
[14, 15] for extensions of this setting). One of their very first results is the observation that the celebrated
VCG mechanism [19, 7, 12] is no longer truthful, which is the case for VCG in our setting as well.
The liquid price of anarchy has been considered in a few related papers so far. Syrgkanis and Tardos [17]
considered the liquid welfare benchmark under the term effective welfare and bounded the ratio between the
optimal liquid welfare and the worst-case social welfare at equilibrium, in various strategic auction settings,
including position mechanisms. Caragiannis and Voudouris [4] and Christodoulou et al. [6] were the first to
provide constant bounds on the liquid price of anarchy (ratio of optimal liquid welfare over worst-case liquid
welfare at equilibrium) of the proportional mechanism for the allocation of divisible resources. These results
are based on the now-standard unilateral deviations technique (see also [16]) and can be extended to more
general equilibrium concepts, given a specific definition of the liquid welfare for randomized allocations.
Our upper bounds follow this technique as well, but it seems non-trivial to extend them to more general
equilibrium concepts due to the particular form of the deviating bids used. For pure equilibria in particular,
by exploiting the structure of worst-case equilibria, Caragiannis and Voudouris [5] were able to characterize
the liquid price of anarchy of all mechanisms for the allocation of a single divisible resource, leading to
tight bounds. Finally, Azar et al. [2] refined the definition of the liquid welfare for randomized allocations
and proved constant liquid price of anarchy bounds over general equilibrium concepts for simultaneous first
price auctions.
In Section 2, we formally describe the setting considered in this paper and the mechanisms that we are
interested in. Then, in Section 3 we prove our main result: the liquid price of anarchy and stability of GSP,
VCG and EGFP is exactly 2. Consequently, in contrast to the no-budget setting, when we consider players
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with budget constraints and the liquid welfare benchmark, these mechanisms do not have socially efficient
equilibria. Such a phenomenon was first observed by Caragiannis and Voudouris [5] for all single divisible
resource allocation mechanisms, and it might be the case that this holds for any position mechanism as well.
We conclude with a short discussion of possible extensions of our work in Section 4.
2 Preliminaries
There are n available positions such that position j has associated click-through-rate (CTR) αj ∈ R>0 such
that αj ≥ αj+1 for j ∈ [n − 1]; let α = (αj)j∈[n] be the vector containing the CTRs of all positions.
Furthermore, there are n players that compete over these positions. Player i has a valuation vi and a total
private budget ci; let v = (vi)i∈[n] and c = (ci)i∈[n] be the vectors containing the valuations and budgets
of all players. The valuation vi indicates the value that player i has per click and, therefore, if player i is
assigned to some position j, then her total value is αjvi. The budget ci can be thought of as an upper bound
to the payment that the player can afford in order to buy some position.
We consider several greedy mechanisms for the allocation of positions to players, which generally work
as follows. Let M be a greedy mechanism. Each player i submits a bid bi that can either be a real non-
negative scalar or a vector of scalars per position, depending on the input format that M requires; let b be
the vector (or matrix) of bids submitted by all players. Then, the players are sorted in non-increasing order
in terms of their bids and the induced ranking σ(b) indicates the position σi(b) that is assigned to each
player i; therefore, we call σ(b) an assignment that is induced by b. Also, let πj(b) denote the player that
is assigned to position j such that πσi(b)(b) = i. The mechanism charges player i an amount of money
pi(b,M) that depends on b, and may or may not depend on ασi(b). Given a bid vector b, each player i has
utility ui(b,M) = ασi(b)vi− pi(b,M) if pi(b,M) ≤ ci, and −∞ otherwise. We focus on three important
greedy allocation mechanisms that function as follows.
Generalized Second Price (GSP)
Each player i submits a scalar bi ∈ R≥0. The players are sorted in non-increasing order in terms of these
bids and are assigned to the corresponding positions. Each player i is charged the next highest bid per
click, that is, the bid of player πσi(b)+1(b) who is assigned to the next position σi(b) + 1. Hence, the
payment of player i is pi(b,GSP) = ασi(b)bpiσi(b)+1(b)
, and her utility can be written as ui(b,GSP) =
ασi(b)
(
vi − bpiσi(b)+1(b)
)
. 1
1Interestingly, Dı´az et al. [8] proved that GSP may not have any equilibria when the number of players exceeds the number of
available positions and proposed alternative mechanisms; we here consider the same number of players and positions.
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Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG)
Again, each player i submits a scalar bi ∈ R≥0, and the players are sorted in non-increasing order in terms
of their bids. Each player i is charged the difference between the social welfare (based on the bids) of the
players ranked below i if i did not participate and their actual social welfare when i participates. In other
words, the payment of player i is pi(b,VCG) =
∑n
j=σi(b)+1
bpi(j)(αj−1−αj), and her utility can be written
as ui(b,VCG) = ασi(b)
(
vi −
1
ασi(b)
∑n
j=σi(b)+1
bpi(j)(αj−1 − αj)
)
.
Expressive Generalized First Price (EGFP)
Each player i submits a vector bi ∈ R
n
≥0 containing a bid per position. The positions are assigned to the
players sequentially so that the next available position gets assigned to the player with the maximum bid
for it, among the players that have not yet been allocated a position. In other words, let Sj be the set of
players that are competing for positions ℓ ≥ j; initially, S1 contains all players. Then, πj(b,EGFP) =
argmaxi∈Sj bi,j . Each player i is charged (in total) her bid for the position that she is allocated, i.e.,
pi(b,EGFP) = bi,σi(b), and her utility is ui(b,EGFP) = ασi(b)vi − bi,σi(b).
The game
Let M ∈ {GSP,VCG,EGFP} be any of the aforementioned position mechanisms. Mechanism M induces
a strategic position game G(M) among the players who act as utility maximizers; this is true even for VCG
as we will see in the next section. A bid vector (or matrix) b is called a pure Nash equilibrium (or, simply,
equilibrium) for G(M) if all players simultaneously maximize their utilities and have no incentive to deviate
to any different bid in order to increase their personal utility, i.e., ui(b,M) ≥ ui((y,b−i),M), for all
players i and bids y 6= bi. Here, the notation (y,b−i) is used to denote the vector (or matrix) that is obtained
by bwhen player i bids y (and all other players bid according to b). Let eq(G(M)) be the set of all equilibria
of the position game G(M).
Liquid welfare, price of anarchy and price of stability
We measure the social efficiency of an assignment σ(b) by the liquid welfare benchmark, which is defined
as the total value of the players, with the value of each player capped by her budget, i.e.,
LW(σ(b)) =
∑
i
min{ασi(b)vi, ci}.
The liquid price of anarchy (liquid price of stability) of a position game G(M) that is induced by a position
mechanism M is defined as the ratio between the optimal liquid welfare achieved by any assignment to the
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minimum (maximum) liquid welfare achieved at any equilibrium assignment. In other words, the liquid
price of anarchy and the liquid price of stability of G(M) are, respectively, equal to
LPoA(G(M)) =
maxy LW(σ(y))
minb∈eq(G(M)) LW(σ(b))
.
and
LPoS(G(M)) =
maxy LW(σ(y))
maxb∈eq(G(M)) LW(σ(b))
.
Then, the liquid price of anarchy and stability of a mechanism M are respectively defined as the worst-case
liquid price of anarchy and stability among all position games that are induced by M , i.e., LPoA(M) =
supG(M) LPoA(G(M)) and LPoS(M) = supG(M) LPoS(G(M)) .
The no-over assumption: no-overbidding and no-overbudgeting
For the GSP and VCG mechanisms, in order to have meaningful bounds on the liquid price of anarchy,
we assume that ασi(b)bi ≤ min{ασi(b)vi, ci} for every player i. This is a combination of the well-known
no-overbidding assumption that demands that bi ≤ vi and a no-overbudgeting assumption that demands that
ασi(b)bi ≤ ci. This assumption is necessary as it is easy (like in the case of the classic price of anarchy
literature that deals with the social welfare objective) to construct position games that have arbitrarily bad
liquid price of anarchy when the players overbid. For the EGFP mechanism such an assumption is of course
not necessary due to the definition of the payment function.
3 Bounds on the liquid price of anarchy and stability
We begin with Theorem 1, where we show that the LPoA and LPoS of GSP, VCG and EGFP are at least
2; notice that the example that we present in the following proof also proves that VCG is no longer truthful
when the players have budget constraints. Then, in Theorem 2 we prove that this bound of 2 on the LPoA
and LPoS is tight.
Theorem 1. The liquid price of anarchy and stability of GSP, VCG (under the no-over assumption) and
EGFP are at least 2.
Proof. LetM ∈ {GSP,VCG,EGFP}, λ > 2 and ε ∈ (0, 1/2). Consider a position game G(M) among two
players with valuations v = (λ, 1) and budgets c = (1 + ε, 1), for two positions with CTRs α = (1, 1/λ).
Observe that, for the two possible assignments (1, 2) and (2, 1), the liquid welfare is LW(1, 2) = min{λ, 1+
ε}+min
{
1
λ
, 1
}
= (1+ε)λ+1
λ
and LW(2, 1) = min{1, 1 + ε}+min{1, 1} = 2. Therefore, since λ > 2 and
ε < 1/2, we have that LW(2, 1) > LW(1, 2), and the optimal assignment is (2, 1). The ratio
LW(2, 1)
LW(1, 2)
=
2λ
(1 + ε)λ+ 1
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tends to 2 as λ becomes arbitrarily large and ε becomes arbitrarily small. In order to prove the theorem, it
suffices to show that there exists an equilibrium bid vector that induces the assignment (1, 2), while there
exists no equilibrium bid vector that induces the assignment (2, 1).
GSP. First, consider the bid vector b = (1+ ε, 1) which induces the assignment (1, 2). The utilities of the
two players are u1(b,GSP) = λ − 1 and u2(b,GSP) =
1
λ
. Player 2 has no incentive to deviate as, by the
no-over assumption, she cannot bid above her budget (which coincides with her value), while any other bid
would not change the assignment. Player 1 obviously has no incentive to deviate to any other bid b′1 ≥ b2 as
the assignment as well as her payment would not change. So, consider the deviation of player 1 to the bid
b′1 = b2− γ, for some γ > 0. Then, the induced assignment would be (2, 1) and player 1 would have utility
u1((b
′
1, b2),GSP) = 1 < u1(b,GSP) since λ > 2. Therefore, b is an equilibrium, and the price of anarchy
bound follows.
Now, assume that there exists an equilibrium bid vector b = (b1, b2) with b1 ≤ b2 ≤ 1 so that the
assignment (2, 1) is induced, while the no-over assumption is satisfied (for player 2). The utilities of the two
players at this equilibrium are u1(b,GSP) = 1 and u2(b,GSP) = 1− b1. Consider the deviation of player
1 to the bid b′1 = c1 = 1 + ε > b2. Then, the utility of this player would be u1((b
′
1, b2),GSP) = λ − b2 ≥
λ − 1 > 1, since b2 ≤ 1 and λ > 2. Hence, player 1 has incentive to deviate to b
′
1 and b cannot be an
equilibrium. The price of stability bound follows.
VCG. Like in the case of GSP, consider the bid vector b = (1 + ǫ, 1) which induces the assignment
(1, 2). The payments of the players are p1(b,VCG) = 1 −
1
λ
and p2(b,VCG) = 0, yielding utilities of
u1(b,VCG) = λ−1+
1
λ
and u2(b,VCG) =
1
λ
. Obviously, again player 2 has no incentive to deviate, while
player 1 has no incentive to deviate to any bid b′1 ≥ b2. So, consider the deviation of player 1 to the bid
b′1 = b2− γ, for some γ > 0. Then, the induced assignment would be (2, 1), the payment of player 1 would
be p1((b
′
1, b2),VCG) = 0 and her utility would be u1((b
′
1, b2),VCG) = 1 < λ − 1 +
1
λ
= u1(b,VCG)
since (λ− 1)2 > 0, for any λ > 2. Therefore, b is an equilibrium, and the price of anarchy bound follows.
Now, assume that there exists an equilibrium bid vector b = (b1, b2) with b1 ≤ b2 ≤ 1 so that the
assignment (2, 1) is induced, while the no-over assumption is satisfied (for player 2). The payments of
the players at this equilibrium are p1(b,VCG) = 0 and p2(b,VCG) = b1
(
1− 1
λ
)
, yielding utilities of
u1(b,VCG) = 1 and u2(b,VCG) = 1 − b1
(
1− 1
λ
)
. Consider the deviation of player 1 to the bid b′1 =
c1 = 1+ε > b2. Then, the induced assignment would be (1, 2), while the payment and the utility of player 1
would be p1((b
′
1, b2),VCG) = b2
(
1− 1
λ
)
≤ 1− 1
λ
and u1((b
′
1, b2),VCG) = λ−p1(b
′
1, b2) ≥ λ−1+
1
λ
> 1,
respectively; the last inequality follows since (λ − 1)2 > 0, for any λ > 2. Hence, since player 1 has
incentive to deviate to b′1, b cannot be an equilibrium, and the price of stability bound follows.
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EGFP. To show that there exists an equilibrium bid vector b that induces the assignment (1, 2), consider
the bids b1 = (1 + δ, 0), where δ > 0 is arbitrarily small, and b2 = (1, 0) of the two players for the
two available positions, respectively. Observe that after the allocation of the first position, the second one
is given without any competition to the only remaining player. Therefore, at equilibrium, no player has
any incentive to submit a bid that is greater than zero for the second position. Player 2 has no incentive
to change her bid for the first position since she simply cannot bid any higher, while bidding any lower
would not change the assignment. Player 1 has no incentive to deviate to any other bid b′1,1 ≥ b2,1 as the
allocation and her payment would not change, and δ is assumed to be arbitrarily small. So, consider the
deviating bid b′1,1 < b2,1 which would change the assignment to (2, 1) and the utility of player 1 would be
u′1(((b
′
1,1, 0),b2),EGFP) = 1 < λ − 1 = u1(b,EGFP). Therefore, b is indeed an equilibrium, and the
price of anarchy bound follows.
For the price of stability bound, assume that there exists an equilibrium bid matrix b such that b1,1 ≤
b2,1 ≤ 1 so that the allocation (2, 1) is induced; again the two players must bid zero for the second position
which is, basically, for free. The utilities of the two players at this equilibrium are u1(b,EGFP) = 1 and
u2(b) = 1 − b2,1. Consider the deviation of player 1 to the bid b
′
1,1 = 1 + δ > b2,1 for the first position,
where δ > 0 is arbitrarily small. Then, player 1 would be allocated the first position and her utility would be
u1(((b
′
1,1, 0),b2),EGFP) = λ− b1,1 = λ− 1− δ > 1, since λ > 2 and δ is arbitrarily small. Hence, player
1 has no incentive to deviate to b′1 = (b
′
1,1, 0), b cannot be an equilibrium, and the proof is complete.
The proof of the upper bounds exploits the well-known technique (for proving welfare guarantees in
games) of deviating bids. However, it is more complicated since the selected deviating bids must be such
that the payments of the players are within their budgets. In fact, this is the main barrier in proving LPoA
bounds for more general equilibrium concepts, like Bayes-Nash equilibria in the incomplete information
model, where the bids of the players are random variables.
Theorem 2. The liquid price of anarchy and stability of GSP, VCG (under the no-over assumption) and
EGFP are at most 2.
Proof. Let M ∈ {GSP,VCG,EGFP} and consider any n-player position game G(M) induced by M . Let
vi and ci be the value and budget of player i ∈ [n], and let αj be the CTR of position j ∈ [n]. Let b
be an equilibrium bid vector that induces an assignment σ(b); recall that πj(b) denotes the player that is
assigned to position j. Moreover, let oi denote the position given to player i at an optimal allocation, and
OPT =
∑
imin{αoivi, ci}.
Now, consider the following partition of the players: A = {i : ασi(b)vi ≤ ci}. Then, for every player
i 6∈ A, we have that min{ασi(b)vi, ci} = ci ≥ min{αoivi, ci}, and by summing over all such players, we
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obtain
∑
i 6∈A
min{ασi(b)vi, ci} ≥
∑
i 6∈A
min{αoivi, ci}. (1)
The rest of the proof is dedicated to showing that, for any player i ∈ A and some γ > 0, it holds that
ui(b) ≥ min{αoivi, ci} −min{αoivpioi(b), cpioi (b)} − γ. (2)
Then, since min{ασi(b)vi, ci} = ασi(b)vi ≥ ui(b), by summing over all players i ∈ A, and by the fact that
|A| ≤ n, we obtain
∑
i∈A
min{ασi(b)vi, ci} ≥
∑
i∈A
min{αoivi, ci} −
∑
i∈A
min{αoivpioi(b), cpioi(b)} − γ|A|
≥
∑
i∈A
min{αoivi, ci} − LW(σ(b)) − γn. (3)
Hence, the theorem will follow by combining inequalities (1) and (3), and by choosing γ to be arbitrarily
small, since we have that
LW(σ(b)) =
∑
i 6∈A
min{ασi(b)vi, ci}+
∑
i∈A
min{ασi(b)vi, ci}
≥
∑
i 6∈A
min{αoivi, ci}+
∑
i∈A
min{αoivi, ci} − LW(σ(b)) − γn
≥ OPT− LW(σ(b)) − γn.
We now distinguish between cases depending on which mechanism is used. In the following, since the
mechanism under consideration is clear from context, we drop it from our notation.
GSP. For any player i ∈ A consider the deviating bid bpioi(b) + γ˜, where bpioi(b) is the bid of the player
that is given position oi at equilibrium and γ˜ =
γ
αoi
is such that bpioi(b) ≤ bpioi(b) + γ˜ ≤ bpioi−1(b); notice
that player i can choose such a γ˜ as she has full information about the bids of the other players, and there
exists a tie-breaking assigning the position oi to player i after the deviation (in case of equality). With this
deviating bid, player i essentially plays only for her optimal position oi, if she can afford to do so.
If the deviating bid bpioi(b) + γ˜ satisfies the no-over assumption, then player i is guaranteed to be given
position oi in the new allocation and pay bpioi(b) per click. By the equilibrium condition, the fact that γ > 0,
and since αoibpioi(b) ≤ min{αoivpioi(b), cpioi(b)} (by the no-over assumption for player πoi(b)), we have
that
ui(b) ≥ ui(bpioi(b) + δ,b−i) = αoi(vi − bpioi(b)) ≥ min{αoivi, ci} −min{αoivpioi(b), cpioi(b)} − γ.
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If the deviating bid does not satisfy the no-over assumption, then we have that bpioi(b) + γ˜ > vi or
αoi(bpioi(b) + γ˜) > ci. Due to the no-over assumption for player πoi(b), both of these inequalities imply
that min{αoivpioi(b), cpioi(b)} + γ > min{αoivi, ci}. Since player i has non-negative utility at equilibrium,
we conclude that
ui(b) ≥ 0 > min{αoivi, ci} −min{αoivpioi(b), cpioi(b)} − γ,
as desired.
VCG. The proof is similar to that for GSP. The main difference here is that when the deviating bid bpioi(b)+
γ˜ of player i ∈ A satisfies the no-over assumption, then player i is again guaranteed to be given position oi,
but now has to pay
∑n
j=oi+1
bpij(b)(αj−1 − αj) in total. Observe that, since VCG is a greedy mechanism,
at equilibrium we have that bpioi(b) ≥ bpij(b) for every j ∈ {oi + 1, ..., n}. This implies that
n∑
j=oi+1
bpij(b)(αj−1 − αj) ≤ bpioi(b)
n∑
j=oi+1
(αj−1 − αj) = bpioi(b)(αoi − αn) ≤ αoibpioi(b).
Using this, we can follow the proof template for GSP and show the desired inequality.
EGFP. For any player i ∈ A consider the deviating bid vector y so that yoi = bpioi(b),oi + γ and yj = 0
for any other position j 6= oi. Again, player i plays only for her optimal position oi, if she can afford to do
so. If yoi > ci, then since the utility of player i is non-negative at equilibrium, we obtain
ui(b) ≥ 0 > ci − bpioi(b),oi − γ ≥ min{αoivi, ci} −min{αoivpioi(b), cpioi(b)} − γ,
where the last inequality follows by the fact that player πoi(b) has non-negative utility at equilibrium and
her payment is within her budget, which imply that bpioi(b),oi ≤ min{αoivpioi(b), cpioi(b)}.
Otherwise, the deviating bid is such that player i is allocated position oi and her payment yoi is within her
budget. Therefore, by the equilibrium condition, and by the fact that bpioi(b),oi ≤ min{αoivpioi(b), cpioi (b)},
we have that
ui(b) ≥ ui(y,b−i) ≥ αoivi − bpioi(b),oi − γ ≥ min{αoivi, ci} −min{αoivpioi(b), cpioi(b)} − γ
and inequality (2) follows.
4 Possible extensions
In this letter, we studied the efficiency of several well-known mechanisms for the allocation of (advertising)
positions to strategic budget-constrained users, and proved that their liquid price of anarchy and stability for
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pure equilibria is exactly 2. Of course, there are multiple interesting open questions that one could attempt to
answer here, like exploring all position mechanisms and bounding their liquid price of anarchy and stability.
In particular, is there any position mechanism with liquid price of anarchy strictly smaller than 2, even for
the fundamental case of two players?
Another important direction for future research is to consider more general settings, with incomplete
information where both the values and the budgets of the players are randomly drawn from some prior
distribution, and bound the liquid price of anarchy of position mechanisms for more general equilibrium
notions, like coarse-correlated and Bayes-Nash equilibria. Finally, it might be interesting to study scenarios
where the budgets of the players are assumed to be common knowledge (or they can be inferred in some
way), and design mechanisms with improved social efficiency guarantees, by exploiting this information.
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